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CHAPTER LVIII
GENERAL PERSHING'S OWN STORY
[Footnote: From General Pershing's official report to the Secretary of
War. November 20, 1918]
Immediately upon receiving my orders I selected a small staff and
proceeded to Europe in order to become familiar with conditions at the
earliest possible moment.
The warmth of our reception in England and France was only equaled by
the readiness of the commanders-in-chief of the veteran armies of the
Allies and their staffs to place their experience at our disposal. In
consultation with them the most effective means of co-operation of
effort was considered. With French and British armies at their maximum
strength, and all efforts to dispossess the enemy from his firmly
intrenched positions in Belgium and France failed, it was necessary to
plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in favor of the
Allies. Taking account of the strength of the central powers at that
time, the immensity of the problem which confronted us could hardly be
overestimated. The first requisite being an organization that could give
intelligent direction to effort, the formation of a General Staff
occupied my early attention.
GENERAL STAFF
A well-organized General Staff through which the commander exercises his
functions is essential to a successful modern army. However capable our
division, our battalion, and our companies as such, success would be
impossible without thoroughly coordinated endeavor. A General Staff
broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto existed in our
army. Under the Commander-in-Chief, this staff must carry out the policy
and direct the details of administration, supply, preparation, and
operations of the army as a whole, with all special branches and bureaus
subject to its control. As models to aid us we had the veteran French
General Staff and the experience of the British who had similarly formed
an organization to meet the demands of a great army. By selecting from
each the features best adapted to our basic organization, and fortified
by our own early experience in the war, the development of our great
General Staff system was completed.
The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its
chief who is an assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. G. 1 is in
charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements, tonnage,
priority of overseas shipment, the auxiliary welfare association and
cognate subjects; G. 2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, gathering and
disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar
subjects; G. 3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, movement
of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G. 4 coordinates
important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for
combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of
hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G. 5
supervises the various schools and has general direction and
coordination of education and training.
The first Chief of Staff was Col. (now Maj.-Gen.) James G. Harbord, who
was succeeded in March, 1918, by Maj.-Gen. James W. McAndrew. To these
officers, to the deputy chief of staff, and to the assistant chiefs of
staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great credit is due for
the results obtained not only in perfecting the General Staff
organization but in applying correct principles to the multiplicity of
problems that have arisen.
ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
After a thorough consideration of allied organizations it was decided
that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of
3,000 men, with three battalions to regiment and four companies of 250
men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments,
a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery,
a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and
military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of
over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German
division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions--four
combat and one depot and one replacement division--and also two
regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With
four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector
with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and
replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.
Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force, which should be
able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the
development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of
the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The
plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month
for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down,
a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month
after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a
complete division in war of movement....
ARTILLERY, AIRPLANES, AND TANKS
Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary
for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important
deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order
to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer
of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery
equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and one
fifty-five G P F guns from their own factories for thirty divisions. The
wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that, although
we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there
were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America on our
front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these types
produced at home thus far received in France are 109 seventy-five
millimeter guns.
In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French
Government came to our aid until our own aviation program should be
under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training
our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit,
observation, and bombing planes. The first airplanes received from home
arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first
American squadron completely equipped by American production, including
airplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918. As to tanks, we
were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we were less
fortunate, for the reason that the French production could barely meet
the requirements of their own armies.
It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken
a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us every
possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in
other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and
tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been
exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own
manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time
the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early
supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.
The welfare of the troops touches my responsibility, as
Commander-in-Chief to the mothers and fathers and kindred of the men who
came to France in the impressionable period of youth. They could not
have the privilege accorded European soldiers during their periods of
leave of visiting their families and renewing their home ties. Fully
realizing that the standard of conduct that should be established for
them must have a permanent influence in their lives and on the character
of their future citizenship, the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian
Association, Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, and the Jewish
Welfare Board, as auxiliaries in this work, were encouraged in every
possible way. The fact that our soldiers, in a land of different customs
and language, have borne themselves in a manner in keeping with the
cause for which they fought, is due not only to the efforts in their
behalf but much more to other high ideals, their discipline, and their
innate sense of self-respect. It should be recorded, however, that the
members of these welfare societies have been untiring in their desire to
be of real service to our officers and men. The patriotic devotion of
these representative men and women has given a new significance to the
Golden Rule, and we owe to them a debt of gratitude that can never be
repaid.
COMBAT OPERATIONS
During our periods of training in the trenches some of our divisions had
engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was
Seicheprey by the Twenty-sixth on April 20th, in the Toul sector, but
none had participated in action as a unit. The First Division, which had
passed through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the
trenches for its first period of instruction at the end of October and
by March 21st, when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had four
divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to
any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed
was such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed.
On March 28th I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had been
agreed upon as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, all of our
forces to be used as he might decide. At his request the First division
was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at
Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt
action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the
Allied premiers and commanders and myself on May 2d by which British
shipping was to transport ten American divisions to the British army
area, where they were to be trained and equipped, and additional British
shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for use
elsewhere.
On April 26th the First Division had gone into the line in the
Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle front. Tactics had been
suddenly revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident
of the results of their training, were eager for the test. On the
morning of May 28th this division attacked the commanding German
position in its front, taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny
and all other objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly
against vicious counter-attacks and galling artillery fire. Although
local, this brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it
demonstrated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and
also that the enemy's troops were not altogether invincible.
The Germans' Aisne offensive, which began on May 27th, had advanced
rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the Allies faced a crisis
equally as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in March. Again every
available man was placed at Marshal Foch's disposal, and the Third
Division, which had just come from its preliminary training in the
trenches, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized machine-gun battalion
preceded the other units and successfully held the bridge-head at the
Marne, opposite Chateau-Thierry. The Second Division, in reserve near
Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and other available transport to
check the progress of the enemy toward Paris. The division attacked and
retook the town and railroad station at Bouresches and sturdily held its
ground against the enemy's best guard divisions. In the battle of
Belleau Wood, which followed, our men proved their superiority and
gained a strong tactical position, with far greater loss to the enemy
than to ourselves. On July 1st, before the Second was relieved, it
captured the village of Vaux with most splendid precision.
Meanwhile our Second Corps, under Maj.-Gen. George W. Read, had been
organized for the command of our divisions with the British, which were
held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. Five of
the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area in June, three to
relieve divisions in Lorraine and the Vosges and two to the Paris area
to join the group of American divisions which stood between the city and
any farther advance of the enemy in that direction.
The great June-July troop movement from the States was well under way,
and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training
before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of
all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves.
Elements of the Forty-second Division were in the line east of Rheims
against the German offensive of July 15th, and held their ground
unflinchingly. On the right flank of this offensive four companies of
the Twenty-eighth Division were in position in face of the advancing
waves of the German infantry. The Third Division was holding the bank of
the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of the Surmelin to the west of
Mezy, opposite Chateau-Thierry, where a large force of German infantry
sought to force a passage under support of powerful artillery
concentrations and under cover of smoke screens. A single regiment of
the Third wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals
on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its
front while, on either flank, the Germans, who had gained a footing,
pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German
attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in
throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600
prisoners.
The great force of the German Chateau-Thierry offensive established the
deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the
vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his
disadvantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every
division with any sort of training was made available for use in a
counter-offensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on
July 18th was given to our First and Second divisions in company with
chosen French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a
preliminary bombardment, the massed French and American artillery,
firing by the map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the
infantry began its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under
these trying conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enemy
brought up large numbers of reserves and made a stubborn defense both
with machine guns and artillery, but through five days' fighting the
First Division continued to advance until it had gained the heights
above Soissons and captured the village of Berzy-le-sec. The Second
Division took Beau Repaire farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance and
reached a position in front of Tigny at the end of its second day. These
two divisions captured 7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery.
The Twenty-sixth Division, which, with a French division, was under
command of our First Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement toward
Soissons. On the 18th it took the village of Torcy while the Third
Division was crossing the Marne in pursuit of the retiring enemy. The
Twenty-sixth attacked again on the 21st, and the enemy withdrew past the
Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road. The Third Division, continuing its
progress, took the heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of
Charteves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine-gun and artillery
fire.
On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and Epieds,
our Forty-second Division, which had been brought over from the
Champagne, relieved the Twenty-sixth and, fighting its way through the
Foret de Fere, overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. By the
27th it had reached the Ourcq, whence the Third and Fourth divisions
were already advancing, while the French divisions with which we were
co-operating were moving forward at other points.
The Third Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th
and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the Thirty-second. The
Forty-second and Thirty-second undertook the task of conquering the
heights beyond Cierges, the Forty-second capturing Sergy and the
Thirty-second capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in the
pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of reducing
the salient was finished. Meanwhile the Forty-second was relieved by the
Fourth at Chery-Chartreuve, and the Thirty-second by the Twenty-eighth,
while the Seventy-seventh Division took up a position on the Vesle. The
operations of these divisions on the Vesle were under the Third Corps,
Maj.-Gen. Robert L. Bullard, commanding.
BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL
With the reduction of the Marne salient we could look forward to the
concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the
forthcoming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long
been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First
Army was organized on August 10th under my personal command. While
American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the
western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons,
a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the
American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a
permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30th, the line
beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the
west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was
placed under my command. The American sector was afterwards extended
across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and included
the Second Colonial French, which held the point of the salient, and the
Seventeenth French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.
The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable
defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of
corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the
location of hospitals, and the molding together of all of the elements
of a great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by our
own Service of Supply. The concentration for this operation, which was
to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of
approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most
careful attention to every detail.
[Illustration: Photograph]
Copyright Committee on Public Information.
THE AMERICAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE FIELD
Photograph of General John J. Pershing just after he had been
decorated with the Star and Ribbon of the Legion of Honor of France,
the highest decoration ever awarded an American soldier. General
Pershing was raised to a full generalship soon after his arrival in
France, an honor which has previously been held only by Washington,
Grant, Sherman and Sheridan.
[Illustration: Photograph]
NOTED AMERICAN GENERALS
General March is chief of staff of the American Army,
Lieutenant-Generals Liggett and Bullard commanded the First and Second
Armies respectively, and Major-Generals Wright and Read are corps
commanders.
The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and army
artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of
our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns
were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail
movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command
which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces,
gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in
one operation on the western front.
From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the
Moselle River the line was roughly forty miles long and situated on
commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our First
Corps (Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second divisions) under
command of Major-General Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on
Pont-a-Mousson, with its left joining our Third Corps (the Eighty-ninth,
Forty-second, and First divisions), under Major-General Joseph T.
Dickman, in line to Xivray, were to swing in toward Vigneulles on the
pivot of the Moselle River for the initial assault. From Xivray to
Mouilly the Second Colonial French Corps was in line in the center and
our Fifth Corps, under command of Major-General George H. Cameron, with
our Twenty-sixth Division and a French division at the western base of
the salient, were to attack three difficult hills--Les Eparges, Combres,
and Amaramthe. Our First Corps had in reserve the Seventy-eighth
Division, our Fourth Corps the Third Division, and our First Army the
Thirty-fifth and Ninety-first Divisions, with the Eightieth and
Thirty-third available. It should be understood that our corps
organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time had
permanent assignments of divisions to corps.
After four hours' artillery preparation, the seven American divisions in
the front line advanced at 5 A. M., on September 12th, assisted by a
limited number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by the
French. These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and
others armed with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands
of barbed wire that protected the enemy's front line and support
trenches, in irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all
defense of an enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery
fire and our sudden approach out of the fog.
Our First Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our Fourth Corps curved
back to the southwest through Nonsard. The Second Colonial French Corps
made the slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the
Fifth Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counter-attack. A rapid
march brought reserve regiments of a division of the Fifth Corps into
Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our
Fourth Corps, closing the salient and forming a new line west of
Thiaucourt to Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of
only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and
443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many
villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position
to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its
first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a
formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had
one to reckon with.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, FIRST PHASE
On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our corps
and army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel, and our divisions
in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area
back of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the
forest of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel, the old German
front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact. In
the general attack all along the line, the operation assigned the
American army as the hinge of this Allied offensive was directed toward
the important railroad communications of the German armies through
Mezieres and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines
or the withdrawal of his forces with four years' accumulation of plants
and material would be dangerously imperiled.
The German army had as yet shown no demoralization and, while the mass
of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions, and
notably its machine-gun defense, were exhibiting remarkable tactical
efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware
of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that
he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned
with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the
determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected
to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while
the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break
his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.
Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the
Argonne Forest whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense screened by
dense thickets had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of
battle from right to left was the Third Corps from the Meuse to
Malancourt, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth divisions in
line, and the Third Division as corps reserve; the Fifth Corps from
Malancourt to Vauquois, with Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh, and
Ninety-first divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in corps reserve;
and the First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with
Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh divisions in line, and
the Ninety-second in corps reserve. The army reserve consisted of the
First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second divisions.
On the night of September 25th our troops quietly took the place of the
French who thinly held the line in this sector which had long been
inactive. In the attack which began on the 26th we drove through the
barbed wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across No Man's
Land, mastering the first-line defenses. Continuing on the 27th and
28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing number of
enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from three to seven
miles, and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and
Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinonville,
Charpentry, Very, and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our
divisions, which was with the Second Colonial French Corps, captured
Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our
main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of
forcing the battle into the open and were prepared for the enemy's
reaction, which was bound to come as he had good roads and ample
railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.
In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads
across spongy, shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man's
Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put
their shoulders to wheels and dragropes to bring their guns through the
mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the
enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but,
quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counter-attacks in strong
force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quantities of gas.
From September 28th until October 4th we maintained the offensive
against patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of
machine guns, and pushed forward our guns and transport, seizing
strategical points in preparation for further attacks.
OTHER UNITS WITH ALLIES
Other divisions attached to the Allied armies were doing their part. It
was the fortune of our Second Corps, composed of the Twenty-seventh and
Thirtieth divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a
place of honor in co-operation with the Australian Corps, on September
29th and October 1st, in the assault on the Hindenburg line where the
St. Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. The Thirtieth
Division speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its
objectives, while the Twenty-seventh pushed on impetuously through the
main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. In the midst of the
maze of trenches and shell craters and under cross-fire from machine
guns the other elements fought desperately against odds. In this and in
later actions, from October 6th to October 19th, our Second Corps
captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over thirteen miles. The
spirit and aggressiveness of these divisions have been highly praised by
the British army commander under whom they served.
On October 2d to 9th our Second and Thirty-sixth divisions were sent to
assist the French in an important attack against the old German
positions before Rheims. The Second conquered the complicated defense
works on their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest
period of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of
Blanc Mont, which they captured in a second assault, sweeping over it
with consummate dash and skill. This division then repulsed strong
counter-attacks before the village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took
the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield
positions they had held since September, 1914. On October 9th the
Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second and, in its first experience
under fire, withstood very severe artillery bombardment and rapidly took
up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the Aisne.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SECOND PHASE
The Allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in this
crucial contest as the German command threw in more and more first-class
troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the almost
impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this
reinforcement, it was our army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft
was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our
infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience.
The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with
little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving beside
men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans over
night. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which
especially favored the defense, by a prodigal use of machine guns manned
by highly-trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges.
In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable
to accomplish any progress according to previously accepted standards,
but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of
our troops.
On October 4th the attack was renewed all along our front. The Third
Corps tilting to the left followed the Brieulles-Cunel road; our Fifth
Corps took Gesnes while the First Corps advanced for over two miles
along the irregular valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of
the Argonne that bordered the river, used by the enemy with all his art
and weapons of defense. This sort of fighting continued against an enemy
striving to hold every foot of ground and whose very strong
counter-attacks challenged us at every point. On the 7th the First Corps
captured Chatel-Chehery and continued along the river to Cornay. On the
east of Meuse sector one of the two divisions co-operating with the
French captured Consenvoye and the Haumont Woods. On the 9th the Fifth
Corps, in its progress up the Aire, took Fleville, and the Third Corps,
which had continuous fighting against odds, was working its way through
Brieulles and Cunel. On the 10th we had cleared the Argonne Forest of
the enemy.
It was now necessary to constitute a second army, and on October 9th the
immediate command of the First Army was turned over to
Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett. The command of the Second Army, whose
divisions occupied a sector in the Woevre, was given to
Lieutenant-General Robert L. Bullard, who had been commander of the
First Division and then of the Third Corps. Major-General Dickman was
transferred to the command of the First Corps, while the Fifth Corps was
placed under Major-General Charles P. Summerall, who had recently
commanded the First Division. Major-General John L. Hines, who had gone
rapidly up from regimental to division commander, was assigned to the
Third Corps. These four officers had been in France from the early days
of the expedition and had learned their lessons in the school of
practical warfare.
Our constant pressure against the enemy brought day by day more
prisoners, mostly survivors from machine-gun nests captured in fighting
at close quarters. On October 18th there was very fierce fighting in the
Caures Woods east of the Meuse and in the Ormont Woods. On the 14th the
First Corps took St. Juvin, and the Fifth Corps, in hand-to-hand
encounters, entered the formidable Kriemhilde line, where the enemy had
hoped to check us indefinitely. Later the Fifth Corps penetrated further
the Kriemhilde line, and the First Corps took Champigneulles and the
important town of Grandpre. Our dogged offensive was wearing down the
enemy, who continued desperately to throw his best troops against us,
thus weakening his line in front of our Allies and making their advance
less difficult.
DIVISIONS IN BELGIUM
Meanwhile we were not only able to continue the battle, but our
Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first divisions were hastily withdrawn from
our front and dispatched to help the French army in Belgium. Detraining
in the neighborhood of Ypres, these divisions advanced by rapid stages
to the fighting line and were assigned to adjacent French corps. On
October 31st, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, they attacked
and methodically broke down all enemy resistance. On November 3d the
Thirty-seventh had completed its mission in dividing the enemy across
the Escaut River and firmly established itself along the east bank
included in the division zone of action. By a clever flanking movement
troops of the Ninety-first Division captured Spitaals Bosschen, a
difficult wood extending across the central part of the division sector,
reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of Audenarde. These
divisions received high commendation from their corps commanders for
their dash and energy.
MEUSE ARGONNE--LAST PHASE
On the 23d the Third and Fifth corps pushed northward to the level of
Bantheville. While we continued to press forward and throw back the
enemy's violent counter-attacks with great loss to him, a regrouping of
our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidences of loss of
morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and more
fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and the hardships
of very inclement weather.
With comparatively well-rested divisions, the final advance in the
Meuse-Argonne front was begun on November 1st. Our increased artillery
force acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and the
enemy broke before the determined infantry, which, by its persistent
fighting of the past weeks and the dash of this attack, had overcome his
will to resist. The Third Corps took Aincreville, Doulcon, and
Andevanne, and the Fifth Corps took Landres et St. Georges and pressed
through successive lines of resistance to Bayonville and Chennery. On
the 2d the First Corps joined in the movement, which now became an
impetuous onslaught that could not be stayed.
On the 3d advance troops surged forward in pursuit, some by motor
trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close
behind. The First Corps reached Authe and Chatillon-Sur-Bar, the Fifth
Corps, Fosse and Nouart, and the Third Corps Halles, penetrating the
enemy's line to a depth of twelve miles. Our large caliber guns had
advanced and were skillfully brought into position to fire upon the
important lines at Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans. Our Third Corps
crossed the Meuse on the 5th and the other corps, in the full confidence
that the day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine guns as they
swept northward, maintaining complete coordination throughout. On the
6th, a division of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite
Sedan, twenty-five miles from our line of departure. The strategical
goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main
line of communications, and nothing but surrender or an armistice could
save his army from complete disaster.
In all forty enemy divisions had been used against us in the
Meuse-Argonne battle. Between September 26th and November 6th we took
26,059 prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth,
Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh,
Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth,
Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first.
Many of our divisions remained in line for a length of time that
required nerves of steel, while others were sent in again after only a
few days of rest. The First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Forty-second,
Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth were in the line
twice. Although some of the divisions were fighting their first battle,
they soon became equal to the best.
OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MEUSE
On the three days preceding November 10th, the Third, the Second
Colonial, and the Seventeenth French corps fought a difficult struggle
through the Meuse Hills south of Stenay and forced the enemy into the
plain. Meanwhile, my plans for further use of the American forces
contemplated an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle in the
direction of Longwy by the First Army, while, at the same time, the
Second Army should assure the offensive toward the rich coal fields of
Briey. These operations were to be followed by an offensive toward
Chateau-Salins east of the Moselle, thus isolating Metz. Accordingly,
attacks on the American front had been ordered and that of the Second
Army was in progress on the morning of November 11th, when instructions
were received that hostilities should cease at 11 o'clock A. M.
At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left,
began at Port-Sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandieres and
through the Woevre to Bezonvaux in the foothills of the Meuse, thence
along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre
forests to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with
the French under Sedan....
There are in Europe altogether, including a regiment and some sanitary
units with the Italian army and the organizations at Murmansk, also
including those en route from the States, approximately 2,053,347 men,
less our losses. Of this total there are in France 1,338,169 combatant
troops. Forty divisions have arrived, of which the infantry personnel of
ten have been used as replacements, leaving thirty divisions now in
France organized into three armies of three corps each.
The losses of the Americans up to November 18th are: Killed and wounded,
36,145; died of disease, 14,811; deaths unclassified, 2,204; wounded,
179,625; prisoners, 2,163; missing, 1,160. We have captured about 41,000
prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers and trench mortars....
Finally, I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of the
line. When I think of their heroism, their patience under hardships,
their unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with emotion
which I am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and they have
earned the eternal gratitude of our country.
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